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Abstract
We propose a heterogeneous agent market model (HAM) in con-
tinuous time. The market is populated by fundamental traders and
chartists, who both use simple linear trading rules. Most of the re-
lated literature explores stability, price dynamics and profitability ei-
ther within deterministic models or by simulation. Our novel formu-
lation lends itself to analytic treatment even in the stochastic case.
We prove conditions for the (stochastic) stability of the price process,
and also for the price to mean-revert to the fundamental value. As-
suming stability, we derive analytic formulae on how the population
ratios influence price dynamics and the profitability of the strategies.
Our results suggest that whichever trader type is more present in the
market will achieve higher returns.
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1 Introduction
Heterogeneous agent models have enjoyed great success in explaining finan-
cial market phenomena such as fat tails in return distribution, long-range
dependence in volatility, and time series momentum and reversal. Brock and
Hommes (1998) were among the first to have shown how boundedly rational
agents with heterogeneous beliefs can cause market instability when placed
into an evolutionary context. Their discrete time model gave rise to a wide
range of models with interacting agents using different expectation schemes
(see for example Hommes et al. (2005), Chiarella et al. (2006) and Chiarella
et al. (2013)).
Building on the discrete time framework, a number of continuous-time
models have been proposed recently. Continuous-time models are advanta-
geous when certain delayed variables take part of the system, and they offer
more hope for analytic results. He et al. (2009) examine the effect of different
lag lengths of moving average rules technical analysts or “chartists” use as
forecast. He and Zheng (2010) find that an increase in memory length by
the chartists not only can destabilize the market price, but can also stabi-
lize an otherwise unstable market price, leading to stability switching as the
memory length increases. He and Li (2012) show that with the presence of
adaptive heterogeneous agents, a rational route to market instability arises,
and the adaptive switching behavior of agents can increase market price fluc-
tuations. He and Li (2015) find that the performance of momentum strategy
is determined by both time horizon and the market dominance of momentum
traders.
A recurring theme in the papers cited is that market stability is exam-
ined on the “deterministic skeleton” of the otherwise stochastic model, while
profitability of the strategies is evaluated by numerical simulations. In this
paper we handle both areas of interest analytically in a stochastic setting.
We propose a simple linear stochastic model with heterogeneous agents in
continuous time. The interacting agents are the usual fundamental traders
and chartists. Market price is arrived at by a market maker scenario. We
define market stability as the asymptotic stationarity of certain well-suited
processes, and prove conditions for the market to be stable. Given stability,
we show how the strategic parameters and population ratios of the traders
affect the asymptotic stochastic behavior of the market. We also give ana-
lytic formulae for the appropriately defined profitability of the two strategies
– still in a stochastic setting. Our preliminary results suggest that whichever
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trader is more present on the market, will achieve higher returns in the long
run.
2 Model
In this section, we establish an asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents
in continuous time. The approach we take is similar to that of He and Zheng
(2010) and He and Li (2012), among others, and is standard in the heteroge-
neous agent modeling literature. We incorporate investor heterogeneity and
bounded rationality, and examine their effects to the market price behavior.
The model consists of four agents: fundamental traders, who take positions
according to the fundamental value; chartists, who take positions according
to time series momentum; noise traders, who provide an additional stochastic
component in the model; and a market maker, who gathers the positions of
the traders and adjusts the price accordingly. The fundamental traders and
the chartists are interacting agents, while the noise traders and the market
maker are modeled as latent agents.
The financial market we consider consists of a single risky asset (that we
think of as the stock market index), and a single risk-free asset (that we think
of as the money market account). The interacting agents build a portfolio of
these two assets. We focus on the market price dynamics itself, and thus we
keep the agents’ utility maximization problem in the background, and model
their portfolio choice directly.
2.1 Fundamental traders
Let (Ω,A, P ) be a probability space, let W : [0,∞) × Ω 7→ R2×1 be a two
dimensional Wiener process with independent components representing two
different (fundamental and noise trader) risk factors of our model, and let
(Ft)t≥0 denote the natural filtration of W . All the processes described in the
paper are adapted to this filtration.
Let St and Ft denote the (cum dividend) market price and fundamental
value of the risky asset at time t ≥ 0 respectively, with st = log St and ft =
logFt their logarithm. The fundamental value follows a standard geometric
Brownian (GBM) process with drift µ > 0 and volatility σf ∈ R
1×2, and thus
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its logarithm follows:
dft =
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
)
dt+ σf dWt (1)
where x⊤ denotes the transpose of x. We denote by ut the price dislocation:
the log-difference of the market price and the fundamental value: ut = st−ft.
We assume that fundamental traders are able to estimate the fundamental
value and believe that the market price is mean-reverting to this fundamental
value. Accordingly, the greater (lower) the price dislocation ut is, the lower
(higher) proportion of their wealth they invest in the risky asset. Thus, the
proportion of their wealth they invest in the risky asset – portfolio choice for
short – Zf(ut) depends on price dislocation ut with
∂Zf
∂ut
< 0, and we assume
a simple affine function similar to He and Li (2015):
Z
f
t = Z − αfut, (2)
where αf ≥ 0 is the fundamental traders’ sensitivity parameter for price dis-
location and Z > 0 is the natural (positive) mean they invest in the risky
asset. We assume a positive mean because we assume that investors (both
fundamental traders and chartists) are aware of the fundamental value’s pos-
itive drift. We note here that fundamental traders play an inherently mean-
reverting role in this market: the stronger they are, the more closely the
market price follows the fundamental value.
2.2 Chartists
Chartists do not know the fundamental value. Instead, they believe that they
can estimate future price movements from past performance of the risky asset.
We assume chartists to be trend followers (momentum traders): they extrapo-
late recent price movements, and believe that this recent trend will continue.
We define momentum slightly differently than Chiarella et al. (2006) and
He et al. (2018). First, we define ds′t as the change of log market price st
compared to the average change of log fundamental value ft:
ds′t = dst −
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
)
dt
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We define momentum mt through ds
′
t:
mt =
∫ t
t−τ
e−k(t−v) ds′v, (3)
with look-back horizon τ > 0 and decay rate k > 0. In words, momentum
is defined as the exponentially weighted mean of past log price movements
(compared to the average log fundamental value movement) with weights
decreasing the further we go back in time. Using Leibniz’s integral rule, (3)
can be expressed as a stochastic delay differential equation with time delay
τ :
dmt = ds
′
t − e
−kτ ds′t−τ − kmt dt. (4)
We will devote particular attention to the case τ →∞, in which case e−kτ →
0, and (4) becomes a standard stochastic differential equation:
dmt = −kmt dt+ ds
′
t = −kmt dt−
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
)
dt+ dst (5)
The τ → ∞ case is interesting because (5) is much easier to handle mathe-
matically than (4), while it is important to note that k fulfills a similar role
to τ itself: the relevant history taken into account has a magnitude of 1
k
. In
this case we can also interpret momentum as the 1
k
year log-return.
Chartists believe that recent price movements can be extrapolated: the
greater (lower) momentum is, the greater (lower) proportion of their wealth
they invest in the risky asset. Their portfolio choice Zc (mt) depends on
momentum with ∂Z
c
∂mt
> 0 and we assume a simple affine function again:
Zct = Z + αcmt, (6)
where Z > 0 is the same as in (2), and αc ≥ 0 is the chartists’ sensitivity
parameter to momentum. We note here that chartists play an inherently
explosive (with respect to the price dynamics) role in the heterogeneous agent
modeling literature. This role is often alleviated with the use of bounded
demand functions. We assume a simple affine form in (6) as opposed to
the increasing and bounded S-shaped graph used by Chiarella et al. (2006),
because our goal is a linear stochastic model that can be solved analytically.
Our linear model is an approximation at the origin of the S-shaped graph
used by the literature. By this assumption we lose some interesting dynamical
aspects in the deterministic case (σf = σn = 0), but these interesting aspects
are mostly washed away by stochasticity, which we never turn off in this
paper.
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2.3 Market maker, noise traders
Market price is adjusted by the market maker in a similar fashion to Beja and
Goldman (1980) and Chiarella et al. (2006). The market maker aggregates
the excess demand of fundamental traders and chartists, and adjusts the
market price in order to reduce this excess demand while also accounting
for the average increase in the fundamental value. Assume pf ∈ [0, 1] and
pc ∈ [0, 1] with pf + pc = 1 the ratio of fundamental traders and chartists
active on the market, respectively. The aggregate demand of fundamental
traders and chartists is given by
Zt = pfZ
f
t + pcZ
c
t , (7)
and thus the price setting rule of the market maker is
dst =
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
)
dt+ β
(
Zt − Z
)
dt, (8)
where β ≥ 0 is the parameter controlling the speed of price adjustments by
the market maker. We can also think about β as a parameter that determines
the strength of supply-demand pressures on the market price.
We also assume the presence of noise traders or liquidity traders. We
model their perfectly random excess demand through their price impact di-
rectly, and complete (8) with an additive stochastic component to arrive at
the final (log) market price dynamics:
dst =
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
)
dt+ β
(
Zt − Z
)
dt+ σn dWt, (9)
where σn ∈ R
1×2 and Wt is the same two dimensional Wiener process as in
(1).
2.4 Market stability and price dynamics
Since price dislocation ut = st − ft is additive, its change is simply dut =
dst−dft, so we can combine (1), (2), (6), (7) and (9) to arrive at its dynamics:
dut = β (pcαcmt − pfαfut) dt+ (σn − σf ) dWt (10)
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The reason we prefer working with ut instead of st itself is that the dynamics
of ut and ft together contain all stochastic information about st. Since ut and
ft do not have any explicit connection between them, they can be examined
separately. Also, since ft is a random walk process with no stationary dis-
tribution, st cannot have a stationary distribution either, whereas ut might
indeed: if we for example fix pc = 0 in (10) (which corresponds to a market
with no chartists), ut becomes a standard Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with
well-known asymptotically stationary normal distribution.
We can also combine (5) and (10) and use the fact dst = dut + dft to
arrive at the dynamics of mt with only mt and ut on the right hand side:
dmt = (βpcαc − k)mt dt− βpfαfut dt+ σn dWt (11)
The full dynamics of our financial market can be expressed as a three-
dimensional stochastic differential equation system:
d

fu
m


t
=

µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
0
0

 dt+
+

0 0 00 −βpfαf βpcαc
0 −βpfαf βpcαc − k



 ftut
mt

 dt+

 σfσn − σf
σn

 dWt (12)
We can notice a clear disconnection in (12) between ft and (ut, mt)
⊤. Indeed,
we examine the latter separately: let Xt = (ut, mt)
⊤, and
dXt = −ΘXt dt+ Σ dWt, where (13)
Θ =
(
βpfαf −βpcαc
βpfαf k − βpcαc
)
∈ R2×2 and Σ =
(
σn − σf
σn
)
∈ R2×2.
Xt is a two dimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with no constant
drift term, driven by a two dimensional Wiener process with independent
components. Let us denote by σu the first row of the volatility matrix, i.e.
σu = σn − σf , and also let us introduce qi = βpiαi, i ∈ {f, c}.
Definition 1. We say that the market defined by (12) is stable if its com-
ponent Xt = (ut, mt)
⊤ is (asymptotically) stationary.
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Asymptotic stationarity of the system Xt implies that neither the com-
ponent ut nor mt “blows up” – log market price st does not wander too far
from the log fundamental value, thus price dislocation and momentum are
ergodic. We interpret this qualitative property of the market as stability.
Proposition 1. Conditions
β (pcαc − pfαf ) < k (C1)
βpfαf > 0 (C2)
are necessary and sufficient for the market defined by (12) to be stable.
Proof. Xt defined by (13) has the solution
1
Xt = e
−ΘtX0 +
∫ t
0
eΘ(t−v)Σ dWv, (14)
which is asymptotically stationary if and only if – according to (Shreve 2004)
– the ordinary differential equation system
x˙ = −Θx
is strongly stable, which requires that the real part of all the eigenvalues of
Θ are strictly positive. This holds if pcαc − pfαf <
k
β
and βpfαfk > 0 both
hold.
We interpret Proposition 1 through price dislocation ut. Condition (C1)
says that market stability requires that the relative strength of the chartists
compared to that of the fundamental traders (pcαc − pfαf) be not too great.
Here we define relative strength as the product of the traders’ population
ratio pi and the sensitivity parameter αi of their strategy. All else being
equal, the greater the relative strength of fundamental traders (chartists)
is, the stronger their mean-reverting (explosive) price impact is felt on the
market. While chartists are allowed to be stronger than fundamental traders,
they cannot be too strong for the market to be stable.
The maximum difference of relative strength is k
β
. The greater the market
maker’s parameter β for the speed of price adjustment is, the less powerful
chartists are allowed to be compared to the fundamental traders: If β is high,
1Here eA :=
∑∞
k=0
A
k
k!
, and it holds that
(
eAt
)′
= AeAt.
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chartists’ extrapolative effect is more pronounced on the market, and they
“blow up” the market price more easily.
The inverse is true for decay rate k, which controls the relevant time hori-
zon 1
k
when calculating momentum. The higher k is, the shorter the history
of prices is that is actually driving momentum. When k is very high, mo-
mentum is driven mostly by the perfectly random effect of the noise traders,
and chartists are not able to latch onto the ever increasing (or decreasing)
market price.
Condition (C2) says that the relative strength of the fundamentalists,
the market maker’s parameter and the decay rate all have to be positive.
This condition says that the only way for the log market price to have any
connection to the log fundamental value is that the fundamental traders have
positive relative strength on the market. Also, with no price effect (β = 0),
fundamental traders have no way of pulling the market price towards its
fundamental value, no matter how strong they may be.
Proposition 2. Assume that the market defined by (12) is stable. Then, (14)
has a multivariate normal limiting distribution with
lim
t→∞
E [Xt]
.
= E [X∞] =
(
0
0
)
,
D2 [u∞]
.
= E
[
u2∞
]
=
(kσu + qcσf ) (kσu + qcσf )
⊤ + qfkσuσ
⊤
u
2qfk (qf + k − qc)
,
COV [u∞, m∞]
.
= E [u∞m∞] =
(qc − k) σfσ
⊤
f + kσnσ
⊤
n
2k (qf + k − qc)
,
D2 [m∞]
.
= E
[
m2∞
]
=
qfσfσ
⊤
f + kσnσ
⊤
n
2k (qf + k − qc)
, where σu = σn − σf .
Proof. (14) is a simple stochastic integral, thus it is normally distributed for
all t. The expectation of the stochastic integral component is 0 for all t, thus
lim
t→∞
E [Xt] = lim
t→∞
e−ΘtX0 =
(
0
0
)
if the eigenvalues of Θ are positive, which holds if pcαc − pfαf <
k
β
and
βpfαf > 0.
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Now let ρ : [0,∞) 7→ R2×2, ρt = COV [Xt] = E
[
XtX
⊤
t
]
− E [Xt]E
[
X⊤t
]
and let t be large enough so that ρt ≈ E
[
XtX
⊤
t
]
. Then
dρt = dE
[
XtX
⊤
t
]
= E
[
d
(
XtX
⊤
t
)]
=
= E
[
(dXt)X
⊤
t
]
+ E
[
Xt
(
dX⊤t
)]
+ E
[
dXtdX
⊤
t
]
=
= −ΘE
[
XtX
⊤
t
]
dt−E
[
XtX
⊤
t
]
Θ⊤ dt+ ΣΣ⊤ dt =⇒
=⇒ ρ˙ = −Θρ− ρΘ⊤ + ΣΣ⊤
The covariance matrix of the asymptotic distribution is got by setting ρ˙ = 0,
and solving the resulting system of algebraic equations.
We interpret Proposition 2 by examining some extreme cases. By setting
qc = 0 we arrive at the dynamics where chartists have no effect – this might
happen when their population pc is zero and/or their sensitivity to momen-
tum αc is zero. In this case price dislocation ut is a simple one dimensional
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with asymptotic variance E [u2∞] =
σuσ
⊤
u
2qf
.
The stronger fundamental traders are, the lower the asymptotic variance
of ut is – they keep the market price closer to its fundamental value in the
long run. The inverse is true for the chartists: qc appears in the denominator
with a negative sign and in the numerator with a positive sign, thus the
stronger they are, the greater the variance of ut is.
Now assume as a benchmark model a market where noise traders are so
abundant that neither fundamental traders nor chartists have any effect on
market price. We can implement this in our model by setting β = 0 in (9). The
dynamics of momentum (11) in this case is again a simple one dimensional
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with E [m∗∞] = 0 and E
[
(m∗)2
∞
]
= σnσ
⊤
n
2k
. We will
consider this value as the base variance of momentum (or the base variance
of the 1
k
year log return). Let us compare this base value to the variance of
momentum of the full model:
E [m2∞]
E
[
(m∗)2
∞
] = qf
qf + k − qc
σfσ
⊤
f
σnσ⊤n
+
k
qf + k − qc
(15)
For our interpretation we will assume that the volatility of fundamental value
is lower than that of the market price: σfσ
⊤
f < σnσ
⊤
n (see for example Shiller
(1981) who shows that market price variance is a magnitude greater than the
variance of fundamental value derived as the present value of actual future
dividends). Now assume no chartists on the market, i.e. qc = 0. In this case
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(15) is the convex combination of a number lower than one and one, thus it is
lower than one. This means that the presence of fundamental traders reduces
the variance of 1
k
year log returns. With qc > 0 the ratio above increases –
indeed, it can even rise above one. This implies that the presence of chartists
increases the variance of 1
k
year log returns.
2.5 Profitability of the strategies
We assume that both the fundamental traders and the chartists build a self-
financing portfolio of the stock St and some money-market account Bt. We
denote by V it , i ∈ {f, c} the value of their portfolio at time t. Without loss of
generality, we assume a zero risk-free rate: dBt
Bt
= 0. Since both traders hold
Z it , i ∈ {f, c} proportion of their wealth in the risky asset, we arrive at the
dynamics of their portfolio by using the self-financing assumption:
dV it = Z
i
tV
i
t
dSt
St
+
(
1− Z it
)
V it
dBt
Bt
= Z itV
i
t
dSt
St
(16)
We assume a logarithmic utility function of their wealth for both the fun-
damental traders and chartists. We are interested in the differences in utility
over a very long time horizon, where the system (ut, mt)
⊤ has already reached
stationarity. Thus we use an appropriately normalized utility function:
Πi = lim
T→∞
E
[
log V iT − log V
i
0
T
]
, (17)
which from now on we will interpret as the average logarithmic growth of the
value of the agents’ portfolio over an infinite time horizon. Since we know
the asymptotic distribution of (ut, mt)
⊤, (17) provides analytically tractable
results.
Proposition 3. Assume the market defined by (12) is stable. Assume the in-
vestors’ wealth evolves according to (16). Then the average logarithmic growth
(17) of the traders’ wealth is:
Πf = C + βpfα
2
fE
[
u2∞
]
− βpcαcαfE [u∞m∞]− α
2
f
σnσ
⊤
n
2
E
[
u2∞
]
Πc = C + βpcα
2
cE
[
m2∞
]
− βpfαfαcE [u∞m∞]− α
2
c
σnσ
⊤
n
2
E
[
m2∞
]
where C = Z
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
+ (1− Z)
σnσ
⊤
n
2
)
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Proof. We show the calculations for Πf , which go similarly for Πc.
First, from (9) we get the dynamics of St = e
st :
dSt
St
=
(
µ−
σfσ
⊤
f
2
+
σnσ
⊤
n
2
+ β
(
Zt − Z
))
dt+ σn dWt
From (16) we get the dynamics of log V ft :
d
(
log V f
)
t
= Zft
dSt
St
−
(
Z
f
t
)2
2
d〈S〉t
S2t
By using the definitions (2), (6) and (7), we get that
d
(
log V f
)
t
= g
(
ut, mt, utmt, u
2
t
)
dt+ Zft σn dWt
where g : R4 7→ R is an affine function. From here, by using the law of
iterated expectations2 and the fact that we know the asymptotic distribution
of (ut, mt)
⊤ we get that
Πf = lim
T→∞
E
[
log VT − log V0
T
]
=
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
d
(
log V f
)
t
]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
Et
[
d
(
log V f
)
t
]]
=
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
g
(
ut, mt, utmt, u
2
t
)
dt
]
=
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
g
(
E[ut], E[mt], E[utmt], E[u
2
t ]
)
dt =
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
g
(
E[u∞], E[m∞], E[u∞m∞], E[u
2
∞]
)
dt =
= g
(
0, 0, E[u∞m∞], E[u
2
∞]
)
Proposition 3 helps us answer which strategy “wins” in the long run:
2Here we denote the conditional expectation by Et, i.e. E [XT |Ft]
.
= Et [XT ].
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Proposition 4. The difference in long-term logarithmic growth of the two
strategies is given by:
Πf − Πc =
σnσ
⊤
n
2
(
α2cE
[
m2∞
]
− α2fE
[
u2∞
])
+ (pf − pc) βαfαcE [u∞m∞] +
+ β
(
pfα
2
fE
[
u2∞
]
− pcα
2
cE
[
m2∞
])
(18)
Proof. A direct consequence of Proposition 3.
We interpret Proposition 4 through the effects of population ratios. While
we should not forget that population ratios do affect all the moments present
in (18), it seems as if Πf − Πc is increasing in pf . While the exact effect of
population ratios is more complex and should be investigated further, for
now we claim (as a first order approximation) that whichever trader is more
populous on the market, wins in the long run.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a simple linear stochastic model of a financial mar-
ket populated by heterogeneous agents. The agents modeled explicitly are
fundamental traders (who buy the risky asset when it is below its fundamen-
tal value, and sell when it is above) and chartists (who follow a momentum
indicator). A market maker gathers the positions of the two trader types
and adjusts the market price accordingly. Noise traders are also present and
provide volatility in market price.
We define market stability through the asymptotic stationarity of the
indicators followed by the two traders (price dislocation and momentum).
We prove stability conditions for, and calculate the asymptotic behavior of
the market. We also provide analytic formulae for the profitability of the
two trading strategies. Our preliminary results suggest that whichever trader
type is more present in the market achieves higher returns in the long run.
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